Secret Alliances Page 5

  In the Admiralty, NID 1 [Naval Intelligence Division 1], the geographical section dealing with Germany, was responsible for interpreting the SIS and diplomatic reports bearing on German intentions in Scandinavia, but the OIC [Operational Intelligence Centre], which was responsible for operational intelligence, including that of studying German ships and aircraft, received by no means all of the SIS and diplomatic information. To make matters worse, relations between NID 1 and the OIC were not good, and NID 17¶ was not properly coordinating their output.14

  The situation in the other departments was little different. Moreover, they did not find it easy to make assessments independently of the operational branches which they served, and tended to reach conclusions dictated by their expectations. While the intelligence which described aspects of German plans and preparations for an invasion of Norway was plentiful, none of it pointed unambiguously towards a specific plan. This made the lack of any central government body equipped to carry out an assessment of intelligence and other reporting all the more acute. The JIC was not at this time capable of carrying out such a role. So from the British point of view, the failure to anticipate the German invasion was caused not so much by a failure to provide relevant intelligence, as by a widespread failure to distribute and assess it adequately.

  During the period immediately after the German invasion, it was recognised that changes needed to be made to make the JIC more authoritative, and to give it broader responsibilities which would help to ensure that the handling and assessment of intelligence was more effective in future. Chamberlain signed off the recommendations on 8 May, two days before he resigned, and they were endorsed by Churchill shortly after he took office.15 Apart from the replacement of Chamberlain by Churchill, the one positive outcome of the German invasion of Norway, therefore, was that it forced changes on the central government machinery for dealing with intelligence, which left it better equipped to make proper use of the growing volume of intelligence which became available during the rest of the war.||

  Norwegian knowledge

  And what of the Norwegians? Had the concern to maintain their neutrality led them to underestimate the indications they picked up about the growing threat, at a time when they also had reason to be concerned about the possibility of British and Allied intervention? How could they judge which threat was the most serious? There were violations of Norwegian neutrality at sea and also in the air, committed by both Germany and Britain.** 16 These added to the tensions, and the British action against the Altmark was seen as an even more serious breach of Norwegian neutrality.

  In September 1939 the British had given the Norwegian foreign minister, Halvdan Koht, a confidential assurance of British support in the event of a German attack on Norway. However, their behaviour over the next six months gave the Norwegians good reason to be more concerned about the possibility of a British plan to land in Norway than a German invasion. There were two main reasons for this. First, the ‘Winter War’ started by the Soviet invasion of Finland in November 1939 led Britain and France to plan an intervention to support Finland with troops which would have been sent in transit through Norway and Sweden. This would have had the advantage of enabling them to seize control of the iron ore fields in northern Sweden, thereby depriving Germany of a significant part of the iron ore which it needed. The Germans were certainly aware of this plan, which added impetus to their preparations for an invasion of their own to pre-empt Anglo-French landings. The Finnish armistice removed the justification for either side to continue their planning for this reason alone. Secondly, British attention was still centred on Narvik, the port from which much Swedish iron ore was shipped to Germany. After several previously planned attempts had been abandoned Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, obtained agreement to sow mines within Norwegian territorial waters which would obstruct this traffic, in an operation improbably codenamed WILFRED. After providing a warning of their intentions several days earlier, the British Navy did lay some mines and so informed the Norwegians, on 8 April.

  Against this background, it is scarcely surprising that the Norwegians devoted less attention to consideration of the possibility of a German invasion. A Norwegian commission of investigation was appointed after the war to consider whether the actions of the wartime government gave grounds for impeachment. It concluded that the warnings which the government had received before 5 April ‘were consistent with the threat perception that a British action against the iron ore traffic might trigger a German reaction’.17 The Norwegians did not receive any specific indications about a German initiative until a message from the Norwegian legation in Berlin on 4 April, which reported an imminent invasion of the Netherlands and mentioned the possibility of an attack on Denmark – but not Norway. A threat to Norway was only mentioned in a subsequent report on the following day, which had also been picked up by the Danish legation.†† There were further, more specific, warnings over the next few days giving details of German naval movements, but none provided clarity about the scope of any German action. Some limited measures were taken to increase preparedness, but mobilisation was not ordered until after the invasion had begun – too late to have any chance of making a significant difference.

  The German campaign to subdue Norway lasted barely two months. Their landings were virtually unopposed, and British actions to send an expeditionary force were poorly organised. Allied troops were despatched without the proper equipment, so either they could not deploy, or they were unable to fight effectively. However, two events of great significance took place in the early stages. First, the German cruiser Blücher was sunk by artillery fire and torpedoes from the Oscarsborg fortress as she led the German task force at night up the Oslofjord. The Blücher was carrying a divisional headquarters and specialist troops for the occupation of Oslo and the capture of King Haakon. The rest of the fleet bound for Oslo delayed until the following day, and this pause allowed time for the King and his government to escape from the capital, and also for the gold reserves to be moved. The failure of this part of the plan, as well as of subsequent attempts to kill King Haakon by bombing attacks as the party travelled northwards, meant that he and the government were able to travel to Britain to organise resistance. Secondly, C. J. Hambro, the president of the Storting, the Norwegian parliament, convened a meeting in Elverum soon after they had left Oslo. The Storting passed a resolution investing the government with plenary powers, until the legislature was reconvened by agreement between the government and its own presidential body. The purpose of this measure was to enable the government to continue to function with legitimacy wherever it might be, even abroad. It was an act of considerable foresight on Hambro’s part.

  Hampered by inadequacies in both numbers and equipment and lacking coordination among themselves and with Norwegian forces in whom they were reluctant to confide, the Allied forces were never on equal terms.‡‡ Unable to resist the German onslaught, they abandoned the south of Norway on 3 May. They fared rather better in the north, and with effective naval assistance were able to eliminate a force of ten German destroyers which was carrying troops intended to reinforce those which had already landed at Narvik. After a series of engagements carried out mainly by Norwegian troops over several weeks, a combined force succeeded in capturing the port. Many of the port installations were destroyed during the assault, which subsequently hampered and delayed later attempts to export Swedish iron ore to Germany. However, by now the Germans had begun their invasion of France and the Low Countries, so both Britain and France decided to withdraw all their forces to reinforce their own defences.§§ On 7 June, King Haakon and most of his government left Tromsø for Britain on Devonshire. The following day, to the intense disappointment of the Norwegians, the Allies gave up Narvik and left. On the way home the aircraft carrier Glorious, with her escort of two destroyers, were sunk by a German battle group led by the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau. More than 1,500 men were lost, the most costly individual action in the whole campaign. The Norwegian com
mander General Ruge, who had chosen to remain behind with his men, had no choice but to surrender.

  Believing that he had the support of Hitler, Vidkun Quisling announced himself as Prime Minister at the head of a national government on the same day as the German invasion, but his take-over was short-lived. Unable to gain popular support, he was removed within a week. The government was replaced by an Administrative Council of officials, following an initiative by the High Court. In overall charge, the Germans appointed Josef Terboven as Reichskommissar, a position he held until the end of the war. Soon after the surrender in northern Norway, the Germans sought to use the Storting to vote to remove both the King and the Nygaardsvold government from office, undertaking to nominate a new ‘constitutional’ government and to withdraw the Reichskommissar. Their attempt to exercise control in this way failed. Although the Storting was not in formal session, party groups did pass such a resolution and it was forwarded to London. However, the king broadcast a dignified refusal, and his response was printed and widely circulated within Norway. The process by which the Germans sought to win popular support was protracted but not effective. Eventually, in September, the political parties reacted adversely to the changes which Terboven made to his original proposals, and to his increasing introduction of NS co-optees into positions of power. Terboven therefore announced on 25 September that all political parties other than NS would be dissolved, and the Administrative Council would be replaced by commissary ministers. These were for the most part NS members or sympathisers who ran government departments under direct German supervision. The government of Norway was from then on under the effective control of an administrative organisation comprising several hundred German officials. Over the next few months, German control was extended further. Local government councils lost their powers which were transferred to nominated local ‘leaders’. Members of the Supreme Court resigned in protest at measures which reduced the independence of the judiciary. This was truly the darkest period in Norwegian history.

  It took time for the Norwegians to establish themselves in London, to find suitable accommodation, work out their priorities and begin to develop relations with the British government. Their attempts were not helped by a degree of disunity and lack of coordination. This was perhaps best illustrated by the meeting which Hambro, the President of the Storting, who held no official government position, held with Halifax on 11 June. Hambro sought confirmation that Britain recognised the Norwegian government in exile (which was immediately forthcoming) and raised concerns about extraterritoriality, providing exemption from British laws. The Foreign Office found a flexible way of dealing with this for the Norwegians as for other exiled governments, and never allowed it to become a problem. Hambro then referred in very disparaging terms to the ‘criminal lack of preparation’ for defence in Norway, and the naivety of the whole Cabinet, particularly Koht. He complained too about BBC broadcasts to Norway, saying that they made him sick, and he understood that they had a similar effect on all Norwegians, who were exasperated by commonplaces and the doctoring of hard facts.18 Shortly afterwards, Laurence Collier, the head of Northern Department, reported an approach by Birger Ljungberg (Minister of Defence) and Trygve Lie (Minister of Supply) who asked him to inform the authorities that Hambro was not authorised by the Norwegian government to discuss broadcasting or anything else on their behalf.¶¶ 19

  There was also some extensive manoeuvring to remove Koht as Foreign Minister. It was started by a letter from five prominent intellectuals, led by Arne Ording, a professor at Oslo University, who wrote to the government on 5 July 1940 to suggest much more active Norwegian participation in the alliance with Britain. This represented a significant change from the traditional Norwegian preference for neutrality so long espoused by Koht, and it took several months before the sometimes heated debate was resolved. Koht took leave of absence at the end of November, and was replaced by Trygve Lie.|||| The new alliance policy was announced in December and a formal military agreement, allowing for identifiably Norwegian units to operate under British operational control until the end of the war, was signed in May 1941.

  Lie was quick to make an impact. Chapter 1 described how he sought closer cooperation with the British. At his first meeting with the Foreign Secretary, Eden agreed that more consideration should be shown to the Norwegians and suggested they should meet fortnightly. Eden hoped that Nygaardsvold, Lie and Colban (Norwegian minister to Britain) could also meet monthly, to discuss ‘a number of matters of all kinds which concerned our countries, and Lie would let me know in advance what they would be’.20 This marked the beginning of a close personal relationship and demonstrated recognition of the value which Norway could provide as an alliance partner. Lie enjoyed more unrestricted access to Eden than any other Foreign Minister of a government in exile, and certainly used it to Norwegian advantage.

  First operations: SIS and Hardware

  By the time of Lie’s appointment, Koht and Ljungberg had already been responsible for authorising the first Norwegian links with British intelligence and sabotage organisations. However, even before that the British had sent groups over to Norway to begin resistance activities, using recruits whom they had found for themselves. Not surprisingly, these early operations were the result more of spontaneous improvisation and a desire to start trying to undermine the German occupation, than of any structured planning. Nonetheless, by early May the Ministry of Economic Warfare had already produced a list of six important minerals produced or available in Norway, which they wished to be denied to the Germans, setting out the actions which they wished to be taken.21 The first SIS operation was actually instigated by an officer from NID called Ware, sent to Stavanger to deal with the Altmark, who returned to Britain in mid-May on a fishing boat procured for him and other British officers by Sigurd Jakobsen, a local journalist who accompanied them back to Scotland. Since SIS was at that time preoccupied elsewhere, NID themselves decided to equip Jakobsen with a radio and return him to Norway to report on ship movements. He was for a while accompanied by a British naval officer, Sub-Lieutenant Peters, and when they landed on 7 June they established station Hardware (a rather insecure pun linked to Ware’s surname). Jakobsen found no difficulty in recruiting a group of willing Norwegians to assist him. In two months they sent over eighty messages back to London. However, they had much to learn about security and some got involved in another risky activity, helping refugees to cross the North Sea to Britain, and were betrayed. On 8 August, eighteen of them were arrested. Ten were sentenced to death, though at this early stage of the occupation the Germans wished to appear conciliatory and the sentences were commuted to lengthy prison terms.22 In fact, only a small number of SIS Norwegian agents were executed for intelligence activities alone during the war, though many were killed when resisting arrest, some died in captivity and one was beaten to death by the notorious turncoat Henry Rinnan, of whom more later. Two of those executed were badly let down by the Russians. Thor Sentzen and Hans Michael Skjervø were flown to northern Russia in August 1942, from where it was intended that they should be sent to Kirkenes to provide a coast-watching service. The Russians did not provide the expected support, and instead detained them for some months before re-equipping them with Russian radio crystals and dropping them in Finland, rather than Norway. They were soon captured, and because they were found in possession of Russian equipment, the Germans believed that they were Russian, rather than British agents. Both Sentzen and Skjervø, as well as other SIS agents with whom they were confronted, followed their instructions and refused to admit their connection with the British. They were shot at Trandum in April 1944.23 A second SIS station, Oldell, was established in Oslo in early July and provided some prolific and useful reporting on German naval movements. Some of their agents also became involved in facilitating refugee travel back to Britain. As a result, when the Germans tracked them down in March 1941, five of them were executed. The station had reported concerns that its location was being pinpointed by directi
on finding techniques used by the German radio monitoring service.*** After its capture, the Germans found the codebook used for transmission, which enabled them to decypher previous traffic and thus to identify and arrest more contacts.

  Shortly after Jakobsen and Peters had departed for Norway, Koht asked Sverre Midtskau, a young lieutenant whom he had met on the way back from Norway, to establish a Norwegian intelligence office in London. It was initially known as UD/E.††† In late July, at a meeting with Eden, still at the War Office, and Beaumont-Nesbitt, the director of military intelligence, Koht obtained their agreement for Norwegian contact with SIS. Koht participated in some of their early meetings as they worked out objectives for cooperation. This required some compromise, because SIS was mainly interested in military intelligence with a particular emphasis on naval activities, whereas the Norwegians wanted reliable information about political developments in Norway. Koht and Foley also agreed that the costs would be shared equally between them, and signed a memorandum to that effect.24 Midtskau and four compatriots participated in the first training course at the SIS school in St James’s Street. After its completion, Midtskau and three others were sent back to Norway in September to open two stations, Skylark A in Oslo and Skylark B in Trondheim, though problems with radios and transmission schedules meant that Skylark A never came on the air and Skylark B was inoperative for some time, only making contact with London in January 1941.25 The fifth officer, Bjørn Holtedahl, remained to man the office and to maintain liaison with SIS. At this time, though, neither SIS nor SOE was interested in an official working relationship with the Norwegians, who at this stage were still so limited in manpower that they had little to offer. As long as they had Norwegian consent for their activities, they worked largely independently and recruited agents from among refugees who had fled from Norway. The situation gradually started to change once Finn Nagell, whose journey was arranged through the ill-fated Oldell station, arrived in Britain in November and took over responsibility.