Secret Alliances Read online

  7 NHM, SIS monthly progress report, December 1943.

  8 TNA, FO 371/24828.

  9 Conversation with Haakon Lie, 5 July 2005; also Avon papers Birmingham University, letter from ambassador to Moscow Sir A. C. Kerr to Eden, 20 November 1944, AP SCA 44 19. Kerr had been told of Molotov’s demands in the strictest confidence by Rolf Andvord, Norwegian ambassador to Moscow. Lie also briefed Jens Chr. Hauge, head of Milorg, the Norwegian military resistance organisation, in Stockholm on his way back to London. Olav Njølstad, Jens Chr. Hauge: fullt og helt (Oslo: Aschehaug, 2008), pp. 207–208.

  10 TNA, Sargent minute, 19 February 1944, FO 371/43248.

  11 TNA, despatch from Collier, 5 January 1943, FO 371/36876.

  12 See Tony Insall, Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945–1951 (Oslo: Unipub, 2010).

  13 Margaret Cole and Charles Smith (eds), Democratic Sweden (London: New Fabian Research Bureau, 1938).

  14 Riksarkiv (hereafter RA), Box 71 G8E.2/38.

  15 For example, a report of 17 March 1918 entitled ‘The position of the working classes and the Socialist movement’. TNA, MUN 4/3590.

  16 Alan Judd, The Quest for C: Mansfield Cumming and the Founding of the Secret Service (London: HarperCollins, 1999), pp. 457–458, quoted by Gill Bennett, Churchill’s Man of Mystery (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p. 49.

  17 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909–1949 (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), pp. 279–280. See also Michael Smith, Foley: The Spy Who Saved 10,000 Jews (London: Biteback, 2016), pp. 217–243.

  18 The papers provided to Benjamin Vogt, Norwegian minister in London by Basil Thomson, head of Special Branch, describing Zachariassen’s arrest, interrogation and deportation are in RA, Boks 481 Rets A1.6.

  19 This was reported in Aftenposten on 17 December 1920, quoting a speech by Lloyd George in the House of Commons the previous day and subsequently reported by the legation. TNA, FO 337/90.

  20 For further details, see Tony Insall ‘Britisk sikkerhetstjeneste og mistenkte norske bolsjeviker i mellomkrigstiden’, Arbeiderhistorie, Årbok for Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek (Oslo: LO Media, 2009).

  21 William Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940–1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press 2002), p. 21. The first four chapters of Mackenzie’s book provide a detailed account of the establishment of SOE.

  22 Klugmann’s file in TNA (HS 9/1645) gives much of the background to this remarkable story. See also John Cripps, ‘Mihailović or Tito? How the Codebreakers Helped Churchill Choose’, in Michael Smith and Ralph Erskine (eds), Action This Day (London: Bantam, 2001), pp. 237–263.

  23 See, for example, David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance Movements 1940–1945 (London: Macmillan 1983), Chapter 5.

  24 RA, Nagell papers, box 3.

  25 F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Volume 1 (London: HMSO, 1979), p. 100.

  26 R. V. Jones, Reflections on Intelligence (London: Heinemann, 1989), Chapters 10 and 11. Michael Smith, Foley, pp. 141, 143, 207–208.

  27 NHM, SIS progress reports, June and July 1944.

  28 Conversations with Haakon Lie, 5 and 18 July 2005. Lie had a wide reputation for being a good friend of Israel. See, for example, Hilde Henriksen Waage, ‘How Norway Became One of Israel’s Best Friends’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 2 (March 2000), pp. 189–211, which describes Bryhn’s initiative in arranging for Norway to sell heavy water to Israel in 1958, a most controversial issue both at that time and afterwards.

  29 TNA, Langmo’s SOE PF is HS 9/886/2.

  30 TNA, SOE history in Norway, HS 7/174.

  31 TNA, HS 7/174. The paragraph has been annotated ‘No trace of this exists’. HFM, Wilson, unpublished history, p. 24.

  32 TNA, PREM 3/139/4.

  33 Rob Smith, Radio Times, February 1973.

  * At the beginning of the war, Britain was represented by a legation in Norway, headed by a minister. Its representation was upgraded to an embassy in May 1942, and the then minister Laurence Collier became ambassador to the government in exile.

  † The text of their citations is contained in the Appendix. There will be fairly frequent references to medal awards, so it may be helpful to explain their precedence. The highest award after a Victoria Cross is a DSO, followed by a Distinguished Service Cross (DSC), Military Cross (MC), Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (CGM), Distinguished Service Medal (DSM), Military Medal (MM) and a mention in despatches.

  ‡ The SOE historian M. R. D. Foot estimated that seven-eighths of SOE’s papers have not survived.

  § Before the German invasion, the far-sighted Rygg had already arranged for more than half of Norway’s gold reserves to be shipped directly to New York.

  ¶ According to Dormer, two days before his departure from Tromsø, King Haakon had sent a note to inform him that he had changed his mind and thought he should remain with his people in Norway. Dormer was able to persuade him that he would become a virtual prisoner of the Germans and that this would play into their hands: in Britain he would be a free agent. The King accepted these arguments and agreed to continue with his journey to Britain. As Dormer was leaving, Crown Prince Olav expressed the same views. Dormer was able to persuade him to carry on, too. (The National Archives, hereafter TNA, FO 371/32835. See also François Kersaudy, Norway 1940 (London: Arrow, 1990), p. 222.)

  || There are a number of SIS reports in the MUN series in the National Archive, providing information on German attempts to acquire raw materials for their munitions industry, or to develop new weapons, or on other aspects of their munitions production.

  ** Between 1919 and 1923, DNA was affiliated to the Communist International, or Comintern, the only European socialist party to be so linked. The activities of Norwegian Bolsheviks in Britain were therefore of considerable concern to the Security Service.

  †† For example, T. F. Turner of the Security Service wrote to Ward in Northern Department in July 1940 about Kornelius Støstad, the Norwegian Minister for Social Affairs, who, according to their records, had an extensive history of communist links and on more than one occasion visited Moscow in connection with the Third International. ‘As he does not appear to have very arduous duties with the Norwegian government, we wonder whether they might dispense with him.’ Ward consulted Dormer, who stated that Støstad had been a prominent member of DNA for some years, had much influence in trade union circles and was close to Nygaardsvold. He added that everyone in the Norwegian government had previous connections with the Third International and they could ill afford to lose him. Turner backed down. (TNA, FO 371/24372.)

  ‡‡ Responsibility for propaganda was later transferred to the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) which was established in September 1941.

  §§ This only came to light when the citation for Larsen’s DSO was published in Norway. The error was eventually corrected, and both Larsen and Eidsheim received DSOs in 1948. See Chapter 14.

  ¶¶ VESTIGE parties were small groups equipped with kayaks for the purpose of attacking shipping.

  |||| See Chapter 5.

  *** The first report about the movement of the Bismarck was passed to the British naval attaché in Stockholm, Henry Denham, by the Norwegian military attaché, Ragnvald Roscher Lund. See Chapter 6.

  CHAPTER 2

  THE RESISTANCE BEGINS

  9 APRIL 1940: GERMAN INVASION

  He considered Operation Weserűbung to be particularly daring – in fact one of the rashest undertakings in the history of modern warfare. Precisely that would ensure its success … He described the state of anxiety he would feel until the success of the operation as one of the strongest nervous tensions of his life … He pointed out that the strictest secrecy was vital to the success of the surprise attack.

  EXTRACT FROM GERMAN NAVAL STAFF DIARY, QUOTING AN ADDRESS BY ADOLF HITLER TO A CONFERENCE OF THE SENIOR GERMAN COMMANDERS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING THE INVASION OF NORWAY AND DENMARK
, 1 APRIL 1940.1

  Many of the German commanders who attended this conference with Hitler, to go over the final details of the plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark which began on 9 April, were similarly apprehensive about the risks involved. One admiral considered that 50 per cent losses were to be expected unless there were especially favourable conditions, while the army chief General von Brauchitsch declined to attend the final day of the conference because he did not wish to be too directly associated with such a venture. Including reinforcements, the size of the force was to be about 100,000 men, using most of the German surface fleet as well as transports and some one thousand aircraft.2 Surprise was the element which was key to success. The Germans certainly achieved that. But given the scale of the preparations which it required, as well as the size of the fleet and the length of the journey to the furthest of its Norwegian destinations, how did they manage to achieve success without either the British or the Norwegians learning of the intended invasion and reacting before it started? The shortcomings of the Allied campaign which failed to prevent the German occupation of Norway have been forensically examined and well documented. But was the invasion also preceded by a failure of intelligence, as has sometimes been alleged?3

  There were certainly plenty of indications of German preparations for an offensive. The problem was that no single body existed at that time which received all the reports and was responsible for assessing their significance. One author lists as many as thirty-three between December 1939 and April 1940. These comprised a mixture of pointers mainly from intelligence sources including some Norwegian signals intercepts, as well as service attaché and diplomatic reporting.4 In fact, there were significantly more than these. For example, GC&CS intercepted a Norwegian report of an overflight of Oslo by a German Heinkel 111, and of two further German aircraft overflying Bergen later the same day, 29 March. On 1 April the Foreign Ministry instructed its minister in Berlin to protest: GC&CS circulated the details three days later on 4 April.* 5 An even more telling series of reports were listed in a letter sent by Menzies on 14 April to Lord Hankey, former Cabinet Secretary and a member of the War Cabinet, who had asked him to provide details of SIS intelligence which had warned of the possibility of a German attack on Norway. Menzies summarised the reports which had been sent to a variety of recipients, mainly to the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, but also to the other service departments and the Foreign Office, between 17 November 1939 and early on 9 April.6 His letter also referred to other indications, stating that in May 1939 SIS had sent a copy of Die Seestrategie des Weltkrieges (The Sea Strategy of the World War), published as early as 1929 by the German Admiral Wolfgang Wegener, to the director of naval intelligence, Rear-Admiral John Godfrey. Menzies commented that it was said at the time to be regarded almost as ‘Sea Gospel’ by Hitler. Wegener criticised German policy in the First World War, arguing that Germany had made a serious mistake in not occupying Norway, so breaking the blockade of Germany and gaining important naval bases which could have been used to attack trade routes.†

  SIS reporting about a possible German invasion

  Among the most striking of the seventeen reports listed by Menzies, was one entitled ‘Germany and Scandinavia – Preparations on the Baltic Coast’ which was circulated to the Foreign Office and the Service Departments on 3 January 1940. Menzies commented that these preparations were being made to intimidate the Scandinavian states but drew attention to the caveat which had deliberately been inserted: ‘there may be more than mere intimidation in these measures, because careful observation has disclosed a complete readiness for action at short notice’. There were several more which quoted Grand Admiral Raeder, the head of the German Navy. One, dated 15 January, described a pre-war conversation in which he had outlined his intention to operate from Norwegian bases during the next war, so as to destroy the British blockade. Another described a conference which he had attended in late March, where he had strongly argued the case for a forward naval policy. A fuller version of this report, circulated after the invasion, stated that:

  The naval representatives described the encroachment of the British fleet in the North Sea and the repeat attacks of the British Air Force against the German coastal bases as ‘serious operations directed against the nerve centres of the German Naval and Air Force advance headquarters and a menace to German war supplies’.7

  The conference requested Raeder to draw Hitler’s attention to the possibility of Germany finding herself completely deprived of supplies from Norway, as a result of British countermeasures taken against the constant use of neutral waters by German warships. There were other reports describing different aspects of German preparations, such as cargo and passenger ships being fitted out as transports, troops being trained in embarkation and disembarkation from launches and large troop movements near northern German ports. There was also a reference to preparations for a state of spannung (maximum preparedness) which was to come into operation from 17 March. Hankey passed Menzies’ letter to Sir Horace Wilson, head of the civil service and seconded to Downing Street to work for Chamberlain, and observed that he considered that it exonerated SIS:

  Most of Menzies’ information seems to have been sent to DNI as it was naval business, but we did not get any warnings as far as I can recollect from the Admiralty except the general warnings that came from many sources besides S.S.‡ that ships were being prepared for embarkation purposes and that troops were being practised in embarkation and disembarkation. It is, of course, not the business of S.S. to comment on these facts. They merely furnish them to the Directors of Intelligence of the Service Departments whose business it is to send them to the appropriate authorities. I am not satisfied that the Services have done their job very effectively.8

  But SIS had also provided even more information than this. In late March, Menzies had written to Gladwyn Jebb, Private Secretary to Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, to address the question of what the Germans knew of Allied intentions to send an expeditionary force to Scandinavia and Finland. He quoted a report of mid-March describing Swedish concerns about a rumour which might have come from the Germans, of just such an Allied force being prepared for intervention in Finland, which would be ready to deploy in early April. He referred to a report of a member of Himmler’s staff stating in mid-January that the Allies were believed to have a plan ready for armed intervention in Scandinavia. He also described a report which had been sent to the War Office stating that at a conference of service chiefs in Berlin on 4 March there was a discussion of measures to prevent an extension of the war to Scandinavia, when it was recorded that plans had already been completed for the concentration of a large German expeditionary force in the Baltic coast area. He included further details of German preparations which were not mentioned in his later letter to Hankey. The most interesting aspect of these reports is that they describe German concerns about the possibility of an Allied intervention in the region, and preparations to anticipate it.9 We now know that it was an earlier British intervention on 16 February, the boarding by the Royal Navy of the Altmark in the Jøssingfjord, to secure the release of British prisoners, which convinced Hitler that Norway could no longer enforce its neutrality, and that Britain would not respect it.§ This led him to order that plans for Weserűbung should be speeded up.10 It is not clear why Menzies did not include these details in his letter to Hankey.

  It could be expected that SIS and the service departments would try to avoid or at least reduce the extent to which they could be held responsible for the failure to predict or respond effectively to the German threat. The reader might wonder whether SIS had deliberately omitted from Menzies’ list any reporting which they had previously circulated, but which did not point to the German intention to invade. There were certainly some reports of this nature, but the way in which they were handled is of interest. For example, an SIS report circulated in January 1940 and seen by Cadogan described a rumour circulating in Berlin of a German off
ensive on the Western Front, and another of an attack through Switzerland. The source reported that these rumours were deliberately inspired so as to create a sense of uncertainty in Allied countries. The intention was that the Allies would become so used to them, they would be more inclined to discount genuine plans for an offensive.11 A further report, sent to Jebb on 28 March, stated that the Germans were changing their strategy and abandoning plans for an offensive in the west, apart from air and sea operations against Britain. This would give time to develop Russia’s resources undisturbed, which would reduce the effectiveness of the British blockade. SIS added that they thought it undesirable to give formal circulation to this report, which might prove misleading. Nonetheless, the Foreign Office judged it was probably accurate. On the following day, Cadogan commented to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary, that he had had a growing conviction for some time that the Germans would not undertake a large-scale land offensive. Halifax replied that he would like to mention this in Cabinet, but was dissuaded when Cadogan explained that Menzies was concerned lest the report proved to be misleading. He suggested instead that it should be submitted to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which could give a balanced estimate of its value. The position of the JIC at this time was such that the Foreign Office could not directly commission such work, so Halifax had to write to General Ironside, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to request it. The draft letter was not submitted to him until 9 April, by which time, of course, it was too late.12

  Lack of other indications: shortcomings in assessment

  At this early stage of the war, there was only very limited access to signals intelligence – none of which might have given a more precise indication of German planning. GC&CS had achieved limited readability of some low-level Enigma traffic, mainly used for operational and administrative communications by the German Air Force – but it included nothing which could have given a clue to German intentions.13 Aerial reconnaissance too was of limited value because of the restricted opportunities for its use, which prevented an overall and developing picture from being built up. As we have seen, though, there was a good range of other intelligence available – and considerably more than has generally been realised. But the intelligence branches in the different service departments were not yet accustomed to dealing with information received from different sources, and it was not generally shared. Thus,